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INTRODUCTION
This article seeks to establish and appraise the position of women under the 
law of Zimbabwe. Such a task must start from a consideration of the position of 
women under the constitution. This is because the constitution embodies the 
fundamental principles upon which the state is governed, especially in relation 
to the rights of the subjects of that state. Constitutional rights are often credited 
with a sacrosanctity and significance which does not accord with the practical 
realities of life. Consequently, it is often necessary to pierce this veil of 
mysticism and glorification and temper it with realism. To do this it is necessary 
to understand what constitutions are, how they come about and what their 
strengths and limitations are.
It is trite that the Constitution of a country is its supreme law. The Zimbab­
wean Constitution expressly states that:
“This Constitution is the supreme law of Zimbabwe and if any 
other law is inconsistent with this Constitution that other law 
shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void”.* 1
Thus the Constitution is the ultimate standard against which the legality of 
any act— legislative, administrative, judicial orcxecutive— must be tested, and 
any law or act falling outside the parameters allowed by the Constitution is of no 
force or effect. In thisjvay the Constitution is supposed to function as a check 
against the abuse of power by those who have it. The point must be made, 
however, that while the Zimbabwean Constitution is a check on the exercise of 
government power, it is itself the product of the government’s legislative 
functions, in the sense that it is made by the government through Parliament and 
can be amended to any extent in the same mariner.
Constitutions, like all other laws, do not arise out of thin air. Rather, they 
reflect the realities of daily life, they are an expression of society’s values and 
aspirations and they embody social choices. Broadly speaking, a Constitution 
sets out what can or can not be done and determines the rights and obligations 
of individuals, and according to David G. Gill:
“Rights are social constructs rather than natural phenomenon, as is 
sometimes erroneously and wistfully claimed. Legitimate rights of 
individuals and groups in a society are products of societal
* Lecturer, Department of Private Law, Faculty of Law, University of Zimbabwe.
1 S 3 of the Zimbabwe Constitution Order, S.I. 1979/1600
Z.L. Rev.Vol.61988 65
processes involving conflicts, choices and decisions before they 
become formalized in social policies. The roots of rights.are 
human needs. However, which and whose needs will be satisfied 
out of society’s natural resources and human-created wealth, on 
what terms, when and to what extent, depends on social choices. In 
short, rights are explicit or implicit societal sanctions for satisfac­
tion of specific human needs of certain individuals and groups out 
of society’s concrete and symbolic resources.”2
If the above formulation be accepted, as indeed it should, (even the minutest 
knowledge of the bargaining that preceded the Lancaster House agreement is 
ample proof of this fact), it must follow that the Constitution is a man-made 
creation and that, just as men can make it, so they can unmake it. In fact, the 
Zimbabwe constitution expressly provides that:
“Parliament may amend, add to or repeal any provision of this 
constitution.”3
Therefore, the Constitution can have no more force or authority than that 
enjoyed by its authors, not in their individual capacities but in their capacity as 
representatives of the electorate.
The question arises as to whether by “man” in the statements above is meant 
the male of the human species or the broader sense of homo sapiens in general. 
Due to the homogeneity of most societies there rarely ever is consensus on any 
issue, let alone in relation to contentious issues such as the area.of women’s 
rights. Whose voices are heard and crystalized into the formal position with 
minor qualifications, always depends on who has the means to assert their will. 
v Coming to the area of the Constitutional position of women in Zimbabwe the 
question becomes not only whether women’s voices have been heard but also to 
what extent they can be heard. The answer to this is perhaps best sought in the 
gender configuration of those institutions charged with deciding on these 
matters. Where are the issues crucial in determining women’s rights decided? 
The Legislature is one such place because this is where the laws arc made. The 
(  . Legislature is made up of the Senate and the House of Assembly. At present there 
are only 3 women out of the 40 members of the Senate and 11 women out of the 
100 members ofthe House ofAssembly, making a total of 14 females out of a 
...total of 140. For a law to be passed there must be a majority vote in its favour in 
both the House of Assembly and the Senate. Quite clearly, even if all the female 
members of the Legislative Assembly voted against a law because it discrimi­
nated against women qua women, unless they had the backing of some of the 
male members, they would have no hope of success. It is arguable that if all 
female members of the Legislature arc not for the law then perhaps this is an 
indication that the female component of society is not yet ready for such a law
2 “Societal Violence and Violence in Families” in J Eekelaar and E. Katz (eds), Family 
Violence: An International and Interdisciplinary Study, Toronto, Buttcrworlhs, 19783.
3 S 52 of S.1.1979/1600.
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and that, therefore, the law should not be passed. It is tempting to argue that since 
women make up more than 51% of Zimbabwe’s population, and assuming that 
those female members of thcLegislati vc Assembly are truly representative of the 
female population and its sentiment, then their vote should be taken to be the 
majority vote even though they are only 14 in number. The catch here, of course, 
is that these women arc not in parliament on the “women” ticket but as 
representatives of their respective constituencies. Therefore, perhaps the only 
argument that could be effectively made in this respect is that laws should not be 
simply reflective of current social mores regardless of whether or not they 
advance the desired goal but, rather, should in addition or instead, beacon the 
direction society should follow.
Members of Parliament arc supposed to be elected by members of their. 
constituents. In practice, however, people get into Parliament on party patron­
age, and the party usually puts forward staunch party supporters, or people who 
have connections with high ranking party officials. Accordingly, the probabili­
ties of the members of Parliament holding the same views as those of the party 
arc very high. Perhaps, therefore, what one should look to is the official party 
policy in relation to women, rather than individual convictions on this issue. Jh e  
government is on record as having chosen for itself a socialist path, a fundamen­
tal tenet of which is the equality of the sexes. The official government policy in 
relation to women as enunciated by the District Administrator for Chircdzi, 
Mr. J.L. Pfumojena, is that the equality policy is subject to another overriding 
consideration, viz, the retention of our culture, traditions and all those other 
things that identify us as ourselves— as symbolized by both the creation and the 
retention of the Ministry of Youth, Sports and Culture at a time when perhaps 
some people might have thought it a superfluity. If by this is meant that all 
customs and traditions obtaining in yesteryears be adhered to without regard to 
changes that have occurred and are occurring and especially considering the 
inherent!^sexually discriminatory nature of most of the customs_and traditions, 
this would be a negation of the substantive equality concept. On the other hand, 
howevernnifis broad formulation accepts that culture and tradition grow out of 
people’s lives and that, thcreforclcustoms and traditions/do notremain static but 
rather develop with the change in lifestyles,’and makes provision for this, then 
there might not be any inconsistency between the socialisUinc being trodden by 
the government and a rctentiqnofculturcandjrai^on.
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN GENERAL
Currently theConstitution provides that notwithstanding his/her race, tribe, 
place of origin, political opinions, colour, creed or sex, "every" person in 
Zimbabwe is entitled to the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual, 
viz,
“ (a) life, liberty, security of the person and the protection of law.
(b) freedom of conscience, of expression and of assembly and 
association; and,
(c) protection for the privacy of his home and other property
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and from compulsory acquisition of property without 
compensation”4
Prima facie, therefore, under this broad bestowal of rights which, inciden­
tally, seems to encompass all civil and political rights which one could legiti­
mately claim, there is no distinction on gender-related grounds. It is, however, 
of the utmost importance to note that any formal right is substantive only to the 
extent that it does not impinge on the rights of others or has not otherwise been 
legitimately derogated from and thus the Constitution provides that:
“every person in Zimbabwe is entitled to the fundamental rights 
and freedoms of the individual. . .  but subject to respect for the 
rights and freedoms o f others and for public interest” 
and
“the provisions of this chapter shall have effect for the purpose of 
affording protection of those rights and freedoms subject to such 
limitations o f that protection as are contained herein, being 
limitations designed to ensure that the enjoyment of the said 
rights and freedoms by any person does not prejudice the rights 
and freedoms of others or the public interest”5 (My emphasis)
Put differently, a person’s substantive rights are the residue that remains after 
all the conditions precedent to the enjoyment of the formal rights have been 
satisfied. In fact, at times some of the fundamental rights and freedoms of 
individuals can be suspended, vide,
“Nothing contained in any law shall be held to be in contraven­
tion of sections 13 ,17,20,21,22 or to the extent that the law 
provides for the taking, during a period of public emergency, of 
action for the purpose of dealing with any situation arising during 
that period, and nothing done by any person under the authority 
of any such law shall be held to be in contravention of any of the 
said provisions unless it is shown that the action taken exceeded 
anything which, having due regard to the circumstances prevail­
ing at the time, could reasonably have been thought to be 
required for the purpose of dealing with the situation in mind”.6
In order to ascertain the actual position in relation to the position of women 
under the Constitution it is therefore necessary to examine all the legal principles 
which have a bearing upon women.
4 S. 11 of S.1.1979/1600. It must be noted that this section docs not give any substantive rights 
but merely summarises the rights conferred by sections 13 to 23. See also Austin and 
Harper v Chairman o f the Detainees Review Tribunal and Another, Sc. 108/87.
5 Ibid Section 11.
6 As to how and when a period of public emergency may be declared, see sec. 68 and par. 
1 of Schedule 2.
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THE CONSTITUTION AND DISCRIMINATION
Section 23 (1) provides that:
“Subject to the provisions of this section —
(a) no law shall make any provision that is discriminatory either 
of itself or in its effect; and
(b) no person shall be treated in a discriminatory manner by any 
person by virtue of any written law or in the performance of 
any public office or any public authority”,
and Section 23 (2) adds that:
“for the purposes of subsection (1) a law shall be regarded as 
making a provision that is discriminatory and a person shall be 
regarded as having been treated in a discriminatory manner if, as 
a result of that law or treatment, persons of a particular descrip­
tion by race tribe, place of origin, political opinions, colour or 
creed, arc prejudiced —
(a) ' by being subjected to a condition, restriction, or disability to
which persons of another such description arc not made 
subject; or
(b) by the according to persons of another such description of a 
privilege or advantage which is not accorded to persons of 
the first-mentioned description; and the imposition of that 
condition, restriction, or disability, or the according of that 
privilege or advantage is wholly or mainly attributable to 
that description by race, tribe, place of origin, political 
opinions, colour or creed of the persons concerned.”
This section forbids discrimination on all grounds except sex, thus impliedly 
permitting discrimination on the basis of gender. The constitutional position is 
thus that, while there is nothing to stop Parliament from legislating in such a way 
as to enhance women’s standing vis-a-vis men, should Parliament see it fit to 
discriminate against women because they arc women there is nothing unconsti­
tutional about this. The question arises, from a women’s rights point of view. 
whether this omission is good or bad. To the extent that section 23 allows 
discrimination against women on gender-related grounds it docs women a , 
disservice because by so doing it removes the one ground on which all laws ihaL 
arc inherently discriminatory against women could have been weeded out of the 
Zimbabwean legal system.7
However, insofar as section 23 also allows Parliament to legislate in favour 
of women, it may well be an advantage in that it provides Parliament with a legal
7 For an example of such a law, see Section 15 of the Deeds Registries Act, Chapter 139.
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basis upon which to discriminate against men, in favour of women, either to 
redress the imbalances resulting from years of differential treatment or to eater 
for the different life experiences of men and women. However, this is an abstract 
advantage which can only be actualized if utilized by a progressive Parliament 
with the right orientation.
Section 23 (3) and (4) of the Constitution provides, inter alia, that:
“23(3) Nothing contained in any law shall be held to be in 
contravention of subsection (l)(a) to the extent that the law in 
question relates to any of the following matters —
(a) adoption, marriage, divorce, burial, devolution of property 
on death or othcr.mattcrs of personal law; .
(b) the application of African customary law in any ease 
involving Africans or an African and one or more persons 
who arc not Africans where such persons have consented to 
the application of African customary law in that ease.
23(4) The provisions of subsection (l)(b) shall not apply to 
anything that is expressly or by necessary implication authorized 
to be done by any provision of a law that is referred to in.subsec­
tion (3)”
Presumably, these provisions were made in order to preserve the duality of 
the Zimbabwean legal system.8 African customary law as a whole, but especially 
so in the areas enumerated in section 23(3), is inherently discriminatory against 
women, for instance, in terms of African customary law women never attained 
majority status. The point being made is not that general law is not discri minatory 
against women — the cxislcnccof the marital power is but one illustration of this 
fact —■ but only that in most eases customary law is more so than general law. 
Therefore, were it not for section 23(3) and (4) it might have been at least 
arguable that some of the discriminatory substantive customary law rules arc 
unconstitutional because they place African women in a worse position than 
non-African women and that this differential treatment was based wholly on 
grounds of their race. Apparently, however, one could still argue that if hisZher 
ease fajls outside the class of eases enumerated in section 23(3)(a) then the 
application of discriminatory customary law rules to his/her case without his/her 
consent is unconstitutional. Whether such argument would substantially benefit 
women, however, is doubtful. It appears that, except in relation to the issues 
enumerated in section 23(3) (a), by and large the customary law position is not 
very different from the general law position. In any ease the issues enumerated 
in section 23(3) (a) just about cover all those issues that arc.really important to 
women.
The co-cxislence of general law and Afriean customary law.
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CITIZENSHIP UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
Apparently, the Constitution not only accepts but actually entrenches the 
superiority of husband over wife in relation to citizenship issues. It is not just the 
condition of the legitimate children which is seen as being dependant upon the 
circumstances of the father but that of the wife is also seen as being tied to that 
of the husband. Perhaps nowhere is this more apparent than in the determination 
of citizenship in terms of Chapter 2 of the Constitution. The citizenship of a 
legitimate child is determined by reference t.o the conditions of its father, never" ' 
its mother. In terms of section 5 (l)(c) a legitimate child bom at a time when its 
Talherls unlawfully residing in Zimbabwe is not entitled to Zimbabwean 
citizenship although its mother may have every right to reside in Zimbabwe. In 
like manner, even if the mother of a legitimate child is a Zimbabwean citizen who 
is ordinarily resident in Zimbabwe the fact that the child’s father is not a 
Zimbabwean and is not ordinarily resident in Zimbabwe will cost the child any 
claim to Zimbabwean citizenship.
Also in terms of section 5 the legitimate child of, for example, a Zimbabwean 
New York based female envoy fathered by a Liberian man at a time when he is 
ordinarily resident outside Zimbabwe would not be entitled to Zimbabwean 
citizenship. Given the same set of facts and changing only the Sexes of the parties, 
the child would be a Zimbabwean citizen. In the same vein section 6 provides that 
a legitimate child’s citizenship by descent follows that of its father. Section 7(2) 
provides that any woman married to a Zimbabwean citizen “shall be entitled, 
upon making application. . .  to be registered as a citizen of Zimbabwe”. But the 
same facility is not extended to the non-Zimbabwean husband of a Zimbabwean 
woman. It is provided in subsection 4 of section 7 that persons adopted jointly 
by a man and woman take Zimbabwean citizenship only if “the male adopter was 
a Zimbabwean citizen at the date of adoption.” It is conceded that in terms of 
Section 7(3)
“Any person, one of whose parents is a citizen of Zimbabwe at 
the date of his application, shall be entitled upon making the 
application . . .  to be registered as a citizen of Zimbabwe;
Provided that if the person is not of full age and capacity the 
application shall be made on his behalf by his responsible parent 
or by his guardian or other lawful representative”.
Firstly, the fact that the citizenship is granted upon application is irrelevant, 
the point is that a person whose father is at the relevant time a Zimbabwean is 
automatically entitled to Zimbabwean citizenship by birth —  whereas one 
whose mother is a Zimbabwean citizen actually has to apply for it. Secondly, 
section 7(7) defines responsible parent in relation to a child as being:
“(a) If the father is dead or the mother has been given custody of 
the child by order of a court or has custody of the child by 
virtue of the provisions of law relating to the guardianship of
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children or the child is illegitimate, the mother of the child;
(b) in any other case, the father of the child;”
This maintains the legal superiority of man over woman. The whole chapter 
relating to citizenship shows quite clearly that women feature only when there 
are no male competing interests. In other words, in all those cases in which men 
feature women might as well be non-existent. Further, although Parliament is 
given power in terms of section 9 to add to, amend or appeal the circumstances 
under which a person may acquire or lose Zimbabwean citizenship, this is not a 
power which Parliament may use to change the sexist nature of the chapter on 
citizenship, vide,
“An Act of Parliament may make provision, not inconsistent with 
this Chapter, in respect of citizenship and, without prejudice to 
“the constitutional provisions relating to citizenship contained in 
sections 4-8 inclusive”. [Emphasis added]
Quite clearly, the Constitution of Zimbabwe is inadequate in granting 
women substantive rights against discrimination and in Citizenship law. Not­
withstanding this Constitutional inadequacy however, the independent govern­
ment of Zimbabwe has enacted laws that have gone further than the Constitution 
in the protection or granting of women’s rights. These laws are discussed briefly 
below.
THE CUSTOMARY LAW AND PRIMARY COURTS ACT (ACT 6/81)
The Customary Law and Primary Courts Act, (Act 6/81) is perhaps the first 
major legislative change introduced by the popular black nationalist govern­
ment. Prior to the enactment of this Act customary law had to be applied to certain 
issues. It was provided that:
3(1) Subject to the provisions of this section and of any 
other enactment, in the determination by any court of law of any 
civil case between Africans or between an African and a person 
who is not an African, the decision may be in accordance with 
customary law.
(la) Save as otherwise provided in this section, unless the 
justice of the case otherwise requires—
(a) customary law shall be deemed to be applicable in any 
case which is between Africans and which relates to:
(i) seduction or adultery; or
(ii) the custody or guardianship of children; or
(iii) the devolution otherwise than by will of movable 
property on the death of an African . . . ;  or
(iv) rights in land which is not held under individual 
registered title; or
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(v) marriage consideration; or
(vi) a marriage between Africans contracted under 
African customary law whether or not it has been 
solemnized under the African Marriages Act; and
(b) the law of Rhodesia shall be deemed to be applicable to 
any other case.” 9’10.
Customary law was defined as being “in relation to a particular African tribe 
..  . the legal principles and judicial practices of such tribe except insofar as such 
principles or practices are repugnant to
(a) natural justice or morality;
(b) the provisions o f any enactment:
Provided that nothing in any enactment relating to the age of majority, the 
status of women, the effect of marriage on the properly of the spouses, the 
guardianship of children or the administration of deceased estates, shall affect 
the application of customary law except insofar as such enactment has been 
specifically applied to Africans by that or any other enactment.”11
These two provisions, combined with the fact that most enactments affecting 
the issues enumerated in section 2( 1) above did not in fact affect Africans, meant 
that in most vital areas customary law had to be applied. It has already been 
pointed out above that customary law was, with some exceptions, inherently 
more discriminatory against women than general law. Consequently, these two 
provisions, together with section 3(2) of the same Act served to keep women the 
virtual “possessions” of men. Section 3(2) provided that
“The capacity of any African to enter into any transaction or to 
enforce or defend any rights in a court of law shall, subject to any 
enactment affecting such capacity be determined in accordance 
with the law of Rhodesia: Provided that if the existence or extent 
of any right held or alleged to be held by an African or any 
obligation vesting or alleged to be vesting in an African depends 
on or is governed by customary law, the capacity of the African 
concerned in relation to any matter affecting that right or obliga­
tion shall be governed by Customary law”.
9 Section 3 of the now repealed African Law and Tribal Courts Act, Chapter 237.
10 See, for example, Gonese vMufudza 1977 (1) RLR 49: Richard Shumba v Tsakayi Renzi 
1973 CAACC 7; Fanwell Chamboko v Jonasi Nyamayaro, 1972 CAACC 1; Ndewere v 
Magwede 1960SR N 682; Chiliyo vHlupeni 1940SRN 37; PupurivJohn 1947SRN 181; 
Rusiya v Lucy 1954 SRN 455. However, in view of section 3 of Chapter 237 and now 
section 3 of Act 6/81, it no longer follows that general law applies in all cases in which 
customary law is unascerlainablc, nor is general law necessarily applicable on the basis of 
the justice of the case —  vide, section 4 of Act 6/81.
11 Section 2(1) Chapter 237.
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By virtue of this section it is difficult to conccive of any case in which an 
African woman could have successfully challenged her “belonging” to her 
guardian because, in so far as her “ownership” by her guardian depended upon 
customary law, the capacity of all the people concerned, as well as all other 
matters connected with her guardian’s right had to be determined by reference 
to customary law. Customary law said she belonged to her guardian.
With the enactment of Act 6/81 customary law became applicable only where 
there is no controlling statute; where the parties have expressly or impliedly 
agreed that it should apply and where, from the surrounding circumstances, it 
appears just and proper that it should apply. Considerations of justice may also 
displace the application of customary law. To the extent that Section 3 of Act 6/ 
18 permits a flexible choice of law creating the potential for some women to 
enjoy rights contained under general law, it is a step forward for women. 
However, taking into account their real life situation, it is doubtful whether a 
significant number of them would in fact benefit from thisstandarfland way life 
test with its clearly dollar based content. Surrounding circumstances arc defined 
as being, .
“without limiting the expression . . .
(a) the mode of life of the parties;
(b) the subject matter of the case;
(c) the understanding by the parties of the provisions of 
customary law or the general law of Zimbabwe, as the 
case may be, which apply to the case;
(d) the relative closeness of the case and the parlies to 
customary law or the general law of Zimbabwe, as the 
case may be.”
The other point to note is that, whereas the definition of customary law 
contained in the African Law and Tribal Courts Act had made some enactments 
inapplicable to Africans, the new definition of customary law docs not contain 
any such provision. The question that arises is whether all enactments have, 
withoutregard to when they were enacted or whether or not they were previously 
applicable to Africans, have become applicable to Africans. It would seem that 
since the legal basis on which the enactments were not applicable to Africans has 
been done away with, they are now applicable without regard to race. If this 
submission is correct, it would mean that in so far as some enactments provide 
African women with more rights than they enjoy under customary law the new 
position is an advancement12 of women’s position. If, however, notwithstanding 
the removal of overt racial criteria in the applicability of statutes some enact­
ments remain outside the purview of Africans, then it means there has been no 
consequent enhancement of women’s status.
In 1982 the Customary Law and Primary Courts Act was amended to make
12 See, for example, the Guardianship of Minors Act.
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a husband the person primarily responsible for the maintenance of his wife 
during, and after marriage until her death or remarriage. This principle extends 
even to where the parties have contracted a customary law union. The father of 
a child was also made primarily responsible for the maintenance of that child. 
This was a definite improvement on the old situation since it gave women rights 
they had not enjoyed before. There is no doubt that these provisions discriminate 
against men in favour of women because the primary responsibility is placed on 
men. The fact is that the provisions are a legal expression of the de facto situation 
in the generality of cases. In those cases in which the mother is in a position to 
contribute the courts have always taken this into consideration in their awards.
THE LEGAL AGE OF MAJORITY ACT 15/82 
. This Act is important for two major reasons, viz, that:
(i) it reduces the legal age of majority from 21 years of age to 
18 years of age; and
(ii) for the very first time in Zimbabwe the concept of majority 
status is extended to African women. Prior to this enactment 
African women were perpetual minors except in so far as 
they could be classified as feme soles}3
Now, as was said by the Chief Justice in Katekwe V Mhondoro Mucha- 
baiwa,13 4
“It is common cause that the effect of the Legal Age of Majority 
Act is that the old customary law concept that an African woman 
was a perpetual minor who needed a guardian to assist her in her 
contractual obligations has been done away with because every 
person acquires majority status on the attainment of 18 years.”
The Legal Age of Majority Act tempered the yoke of inferiority tied to 
women by section 3(3) of the Customary Law and Primary Courts Act in all those 
cases in which determination of their capacity by reference to customary law 
would mean that they would be treated as minors when in fact in terms of the 
Legal Age of Majority Act they are majors. Section 3(3) of Act 6/81 now stands 
repealed by Act 15/82 to the extent that the provisions of the earlier statute are 
inconsistent with those of the latter. In relation to disputes involving minor 
African women the proviso is still good law, and women may still be correctly 
labelled the “possessions” of their guardians.
13 R  v Gulayi 1915 SR 49; Kalsandi v Chuma 1937 SRN 6 1946 SRN 117. Nbono v 
Maloxoweni 6 EDC 62.
SC 87/84.14
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THE GENERAL LAWS AMENDMENT ACT, 31/1983
Section 2 of the Sex Disqualification Removal Act, Chapter 339, as amended 
by the General Law Amendment Act, 31/83 provides tha t:
(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any 
law women may hold any public or civil office or appoint­
ment, subject to the same conditions on which such office 
may be held by men.
(2) “Qualifications which when possessed by a man, render him 
eligible for admission to any civil or public office in 
Zimbabwe, by virtue of the possession of such qualifications 
rendering him eligible for admission to a corresponding 
office elsewhere, shall, when possessed by a woman, render 
such woman eligible for admission to any such office in 
Zimbabwe, subject to such terms and conditions as apply to 
men.”
Because of this section, one therefore doubts the legality of the actions of the 
colonial government in making female employees vrork under conditions 
inferior to those of their male counterparts. See, for instance, the table below:
TEACHERS STARTING SALARIES AS OF 1ST JULY 1979 
(Zimbabwe Dollars per annum) 3
Qualification Women Men Difference
Own
Level
Level
Below
3 Ta/ 3 780 4 608 828
4 Ta/ 4 020 4 884 864 588
5 Ta/ 4 260 5 160 900 624
T.C or B Ed Degree 4 764 5 436 672 396
3 Ta/; 4 Ta/; 5 Ta/; and T.C denote teachers holding certificates and 3,4 or 5 years 
of training.
Source: Ministry of Education, “Explanatory Notes on the Teachers Salary Scales”, 
Section 1 Appendix A (1).
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EMPLOYMENT LAWS
Discrimination
The Labour Relations Act, No 16 of 1985 provides that an employer cannot 
discriminate against an employee or prospective employee in any matter on 
gender-related grounds. In so far as the Act only governs labour relations, it 
follows that as long as one is not dealing with labour issues he/she can continue 
to legitimately discriminate on the basis of sex. Even in relation to labour issues 
the Act is not adequate. There is no general right to employment in Zimbabwe. 
Consequently,the choice of an employee ultimately rests with the prospective 
employer and such judgments are sometimes reached on the basis of subjective 
considerations such as a person’s outward appearance or even what favours the 
employer may get from the prospective employee. In any case, even if the 
decision were based squarely on objective criteria, the same result might be 
reached because there arc few women who are as qualified as, or at least qualified 
in the same respects, as men and usually it is men’s qualifications which are well- 
suited to almost immediate absorption into the labour market. It is, therefore, 
possible, notwithstanding the Labour Relations Act, to maintain a job preference 
for men.
Maternity Leave
Under the old Industrial Conciliation Act, Chapter 267, maternity leave was 
available but it was unpaid. Now, in terms of section 18 of the Labour Relations 
Act provision is made for partially-paid maternity leave. If the employee 
applying for maternity leave has accumulated vacation days in the six months 
previous to her application and she is willing to forfeit them then she is entitled 
to at least 75% of her normal salary payable unless she is already working under 
more favourable conditions. If the employee has no vacation days to forfeit or 
she is not willing to forfeit her leave days then she is entitled to 60% of her normal 
salary payable at the usual.time! Although this provision is an improvement on 
the old situation, the fact remains that it sanctions a reduction in the employee’s 
salary at a time when there is an actual increase in her expenses. Quite clearly, 
the provision is based upon the presumption that a woman will marry and be 
wholly or partially maintained therefrom; there is no other logic to explain such 
a situation.
The maternity leave is for a period of 90 days which may be taken as the 
woman wishes. If the birth isaccompanied or followed by complications then the 
period can be extended but without pay. However, a woman can take maternity 
leave on these conditions from the same employer only three times and the births 
of the children have to be at least 24 months aphrt. Some might argue that this 
is a good method of forced family planning15 but to women it may well be a
15 See for instance, J  Kazcmbc, “Women’s Issue” in I. Mandaza (cd.), Zimbabwe: The 
Politics o f Transition.
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double-edged sword. Provided her husband is happy with both the number of 
children and their sexes, all might be well and good. If, however, he is not, and 
she values her marriage and wants to stay in it — Which is. most likely since in 
Zimbabwe marriage is still apparently seen as a woman’s natural slate and the 
measurement of her human worth — then she might well have, to take unpaid 
maternity leave in order to have another baby, hopefully of her husband’s 
preferred sex. •- ' <
The fact that women arc entitled to go on maternity leave and be paid for it 
may in fact bea blessing laced with bitterness. In principle, there is no reason why 
female employees should not be paid their full salary while they arc on maternity 
leave because having children and caring for them is a national duty (albeit an 
unconsciously undertaken one); without the children the nation would have no 
future, and by caring for them without being paid for it women arc actually 
subsidizing the nation. Therefore, that women be paid while on maternity leave 
is not in anyway a privilege. It is a right. However, these provisions make it more 
costly to employ women- than men and might actually operate to prejudice 
women’s employment chances.
Breastfeeding
In terms of the new Labour Relations Act, a nursing employee is entitled to 
two half-hour periods or one hour in which to breast-feed her child. She can take 
this time-off at any time during working hours provided this docs not disrupt the 
employer’s work plan. Quite clearly this is not a right that women can exercise 
unless the social structures for its actualization arc established. Many women 
live far away from their work places. It is therefore not feasible for them to go- 
home, feed their babies and be back all in an hour’s time— the time is not enough 
to allow this and the expense involved is prohibitive. Either kindergartens and 
creches are established at work places or transport is made easily and freely 
available to nursing employees or else this right will remain a theoretical one. 
Not many work places in Zimbabwe boast of creches and/or nurseries and the 
provision of transport for nursing mothers to their homes is so expensive that 
perhaps it should not even be attempted. This makes the establishment of 
reasonably affordable creches and kindergartens at places of work and elsewhere 
one of the few available options. At pre’sent, in an attempt to exercise this right, 
many women who live away from their Places of work have been finishing work 
an hour earlier than normal, but transport problems, bus breakdowns, spares 
shortages and lack of foreign currency, inter alia, all combine to negate their 
right to breast feed their children. Also as observed above, taking into account 
the fact that there is no general right to employment in Zimbabwe, theprovisions 
relating to paid maternity leave, the breast feeding regulations, coupled with the 
current unemployment rate, the employment of women might in fact be consid­
ered an expendable luxury, thus illustrating how difficult it is to implement 
change when the thing/institution sought to be changed is but one facet of a whole 
configuration. \  ,
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Property
In 1982 Parliament also passed the Immovable Properly (Prevention of 
Discrimination) Act16. As the title of the Act implies, this statute only relates to 
immovable property. Therefore, in relation to movable properly discrimination 
against women qua women is still legal. In addition, although this Act places the 
onus on the person accused of discrimination to prove that his actions arc not in 
fact discriminatory, it provides that, provided the discrimination was, inter alia, 
necessary to ensure compliance with the provisions of any other enactment, then 
the discrimination complained of is not actionable discrimination. In other 
words, provided one is acting under any other law which requires discriminating, 
he is not guilty of discrimination within the meaning of Act 19/82. Nor docs Act 
19/82 limit the enactments having such effect to those enactments passed prior 
to the enactment of Act 19/82. In this way the legislature managed to maintain 
a facade of frowning upon discrimination while in fact allowing it.
Act 19/82 also allows discrimination on gender-related grounds if the 
discrimination is justified in the interests of decency or morality or in view of any 
legal disability to which such person or class of persons arc subject, or the 
immovable property concerned was reserved for the use of persons of one sex, 
and the person or class of persons against whom the allegedly discriminatory act 
was committed belonged to the other sex. Firstly, questions of decency and/or 
morality are highly volatile depending, as they do, on societal perceptions on 
which there is very little consensus. Moreover, this very indeterminacy may be 
used to cover discriminatory acts (such as, for instance, arguing that the 
indiscriminate rounding up of women is necessary in the interests of decency and 
morality). More unacceptable, however, is the provision that women can be 
discriminated against on account of any legal disabilities to which they arc 
already subject. Thus, for instance, one can legitimately discriminate against 
women on the ground that the invariable consequences of marriage are a legal 
_ disability justifying discrimination against them; or estate agents could refuse to 
allow women to rent flats on the ground that their rules require that the lessee 
personally occupies the flat, and this would not be certain in the case of women 
because of (prospective) husbands’ rights to decide on the matrimonial home. In 
this way one kind of inequality is used as a justification for legalizing yet another 
kind of inequality, a position which should be untenable in a free Zimbabwe 
treading a socialist path with its emphasis on the equality of the sexes.
CONCLUSION
The position of women now has improved greatly from what it was prior to 
independence, but ihc task is far from being complete. A lot has yet to be done 
to the current constitutional position of women, and especially the institutionali­
zation of sexual discrimination which is a real embarrassment in a supposedly 
socialist Zimbabwe. The sooner the position is rectified, the better for everyone 
concerned, not just to save the faces of our politicians when they talk socialism 
but more so because it is owed toAvomcn.
16 Act 19 of 1982.
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